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MTA-STS and TLS-RPT on Egyptian .eg Domains: We Scanned 332 and Found Zero

Smart One Group Team··8 min read
MTA-STS and TLS-RPT on Egyptian .eg Domains: We Scanned 332 and Found Zero

Summary: On 6 November 2026 at 09:45 Cairo time, Smart One Group scanned DNS for MTA-STS and TLS-RPT across all 332 Egyptian .eg domains in Tranco list 262N9. Of 284 domains with MX records, none published a valid MTA-STS TXT (v=STSv1), none served a valid policy at the standard HTTPS path, and none published TLS-RPT (v=TLSRPTv1). The rate is zero across gov.eg, edu.eg, com.eg and bare .eg. Global adoption is still low (about 0.7% in the top one million domains), but Egypt's gap in this sample is total. An 8-step rollout checklist follows.

Inbound email to Egyptian companies, clinics and public bodies still rides SMTP, a protocol that historically allows clear-text delivery when encryption negotiation fails. The authentication layer (SPF, DKIM and DMARC) that we covered earlier protects against sender spoofing, but it does not require transport encryption between mail servers. That is where MTA-STS and TLS-RPT come in: two standards that resist TLS downgrade attacks and give operators daily visibility into secure-connection failures.

What MTA-STS and TLS-RPT mean

MTA-STS (SMTP MTA Strict Transport Security), defined in RFC 8461, lets a recipient domain advertise via DNS and HTTPS that its mail hosts support PKIX-authenticated TLS, and whether senders must refuse delivery on validation failure or only report it. In one quotable sentence: MTA-STS is a recipient-domain policy that requires authenticated, encrypted SMTP and, in enforce mode, blocks delivery over an insecure channel.

TLS-RPT (SMTP TLS Reporting), the companion standard in RFC 8460, publishes a TXT record at _smtp._tls with a mailto or https rua where senders send aggregate success and failure reports about TLS and MTA-STS. In one sentence: TLS-RPT is a daily reporting channel that helps a domain spot certificate and downgrade problems before it flips the policy to enforce.

The UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and Google Workspace both recommend starting in testing mode with TLS-RPT enabled, watching reports long enough (NCSC suggests at least a month) before moving to enforce. That path reduces the risk of losing inbound mail because of an expired certificate or an MX host missing from the policy.

Why we scanned MTA-STS on Egyptian domains now

URIports' January 2026 survey found only 7,377 domains in the global top one million publishing an MTA-STS policy (0.7%), up from 0.3% in 2024 and 0.5% in 2025. DDMARC's 1 July 2026 sample of the top 10,000 domains reported about 2.6% MTA-STS and about 3% TLS-RPT. Worldwide adoption is still early, yet major providers (including Gmail) honour the policy and emit TLS reports, so publishing the records helps immediately for domains that receive sensitive mail.

Our earlier article on Spamhaus requirements and DMARC under RFC 9989 focused on authentication and spoof reporting. This piece adds the transport layer: forcing TLS and resisting downgrade. We had not covered it before, and we found no published Arabic scan of these records on .eg domains.

How Smart One Group ran the scan

We reused the same list as our earlier probes: 332 Egyptian .eg domains from Tranco list 262N9. At 09:45 Cairo time on 6 November 2026 we queried DNS-over-HTTPS (Cloudflare, with Google as fallback) for:

  • Each domain's MX record, to mark who receives mail.
  • TXT at _mta-sts.{domain}, accepting only records that begin with v=STSv1 and carry an id.
  • TXT at _smtp._tls.{domain}, accepting only v=TLSRPTv1 with a rua.
  • Only when a valid MTA-STS DNS record existed: a short-timeout fetch of https://mta-sts.{domain}/.well-known/mta-sts.txt, parsing mode (testing, enforce or none).

We first verified the resolver logic against known global domains (such as google.com) that correctly return STSv1 and TLSRPTv1, then applied the same logic to the Egyptian sample.

MTA-STS and TLS-RPT results for Egypt

MetricCountShare
Domains scanned (Tranco 262N9)332100%
Domains with MX284 of 33285.5%
Valid MTA-STS TXT (v=STSv1)0 of 2840.0%
Valid MTA-STS policy files over HTTPS00.0%
Valid TLS-RPT TXT (v=TLSRPTv1)0 of 2840.0%
Domains with both MTA-STS and TLS-RPT00.0%

Zero adoption across every zone in the sample

None of the 284 MX domains returned a TXT starting with v=STSv1 at _mta-sts, none served a parseable policy at the well-known path, and none published v=TLSRPTv1 at _smtp._tls. The same zero appears for gov.eg (75 MX domains), edu.eg (87), com.eg (77), bare .eg (33) and org.eg/net.eg/other.

ZoneTotalWith MXValid MTA-STSValid TLS-RPT
gov.eg877500
edu.eg928700
com.eg907700
bare .eg473300
org.eg / net.eg / other161200

Unrelated TXT on the right names

Nine domains returned some TXT at _mta-sts and eight at _smtp._tls, but those strings were vendor verification tokens (for example GlobalSign or panel codes), not STSv1 or TLSRPTv1 records. Per RFC 8461 and RFC 8460 such records are ignored: they do not enable the policy or reporting. Having TXT on the right name is not enough; the syntax is the gate.

What zero means in practice

It means an MTA-STS-aware sender (such as Gmail) finds no policy to enforce TLS when delivering to these domains, so the session remains open to downgrade if an attacker tampers with the SMTP dialogue or MX answers. It also means operators receive no daily TLS-RPT feed about certificate failures or STARTTLS outages from large senders. That is an operational gap, especially for clinics, banks and agencies that exchange personal or financial data by email.

An 8-step checklist to deploy MTA-STS and TLS-RPT in Egypt

  1. Fix the foundation first: review SPF, DKIM and DMARC as in our Egyptian email checklist, and confirm every MX host supports at least TLS 1.2 with a valid certificate matching its hostname.
  2. Inventory real MX hosts: list every inbound MX name, including backups; the MTA-STS policy must name them explicitly, one mx: line each.
  3. Publish a testing policy file: serve https://mta-sts.yourdomain.eg/.well-known/mta-sts.txt starting with version: STSv1, mode: testing, your mx list and a modest max_age (for example 86400 seconds while testing). The HTTPS certificate must be valid for mta-sts.yourdomain.eg.
  4. Publish the discovery TXT: add TXT at _mta-sts.yourdomain.eg with v=STSv1; id=YYYYMMDD01; and change id whenever you update the policy.
  5. Turn on TLS-RPT from day one: add TXT at _smtp._tls.yourdomain.eg as v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tlsrpt@yourdomain.eg (or an https reporting endpoint) and watch the daily reports.
  6. Monitor for at least a month before enforce: follow NCSC advice and clear certificate and missing-MX failures from the reports before you tighten the mode.
  7. Flip to enforce and bump id: set mode to enforce, raise max_age (NCSC suggests at least two weeks, 1209600 seconds), update the HTTPS file first, then change the DNS id immediately.
  8. Tie operations to hosting: on Google Workspace or Microsoft 365, follow the provider's steps for the subdomain and DNS records. On a self-hosted stack, make certificate renewal and expiry alerts part of on-call work, because enforce refuses delivery when a certificate dies.

For the normative text see RFC 8461 on MTA-STS and RFC 8460 on TLS reporting; for a hands-on Google path see Google Workspace help on MTA-STS and TLS reporting; for a cautious rollout method see the NCSC guidance on using MTA-STS to protect email privacy.

Frequently asked questions

Does DMARC replace MTA-STS?

No. DMARC checks sender-identity alignment and decides what to do with spoofed messages at the receiver. MTA-STS forces transport encryption between servers and resists downgrade. The layers complement each other; neither replaces the other.

What is the difference between testing and enforce?

In testing, policy failures are reported via TLS-RPT when present, but the message may still be delivered. In enforce, a compliant sender must not deliver to a host that fails validation or does not support STARTTLS.

Do we need DNSSEC to enable MTA-STS?

No. MTA-STS relies on an HTTPS certificate to fetch the policy instead of DNSSEC, unlike DANE/TLSA. That is one reason it fits domains that have not deployed DNSSEC yet.

How long should we stay in testing before enforce?

NCSC recommends at least a month of testing with TLS-RPT after certificates and MX lists look clean. Exact timing depends on how stable your mail stack is and how much inbound volume you see.

What if we have more than one MX host?

List every allowed MX host in the policy file, each on its own mx: line. Omitting a backup host is a common failure that only appears when the primary MX goes down.

Is MTA-STS useful if some senders do not support it?

Partly yes. Senders that support it (including large providers) will honour the policy. Senders that do not continue as before. The policy does not cut off all mail; it protects a growing share of inbound traffic.

At Smart One Group we help companies and clinics harden hosting and digital infrastructure and tune mail DNS as part of our digital marketing and secure web presence work. If you want an MTA-STS and TLS-RPT review of your .eg domain, get in touch.

MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, Email Security, Egyptian Domains, SMTP Encryption, Cybersecurity

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