Ransomware Recovery Plan in Egypt: Undeletable Backups and the 72-Hour Breach Report

Summary: A ransomware attack on an Egyptian clinic or company is not just an IT outage. It may also be a "personal data breach" as defined by Egypt's Personal Data Protection Law No. 151 of 2020. Article 7 of the Law and Article 5 of its Executive Regulations (Ministerial Decree 816 of 2025) require the controller and the processor to report to the Personal Data Protection Center within 72 hours of becoming aware of a breach, then notify the affected individuals within three working days of that report. A recovery plan therefore needs two things at once: backups an attacker cannot delete, and a written plan for the first 72 hours. This guide gives you a table of the legal duties, eight backup controls drawn from CISA and NCSC guidance, a timeline and a 10-point checklist.
It can start like this: the clinic's reception screen will not open patient files, the company's accounting system shows files with a strange extension, and a note demands payment in cryptocurrency. At that moment many clinic owners and small business owners in Egypt discover that a ransomware response does not begin with the attack. It begins months earlier. Is there a clean backup the attacker never reached? Who decides what happens next? When does the legal reporting clock start? This guide answers those questions using the text of the Egyptian law and its regulations, and published guidance from government cybersecurity agencies.
What is ransomware, and why can it count as a data breach in Egypt?
Ransomware is malicious software that encrypts files and systems so they become unusable, after which the attacker demands a ransom in exchange for a decryption key. The #StopRansomware Guide from the US agency CISA explains that attackers now also steal data before encrypting it and threaten to publish it to pressure victims, a tactic known as "double extortion".
In Egypt, the Personal Data Protection Law No. 151 of 2020 defines a personal data breach as any unauthorised or illegal access to personal data, or any illegitimate operation aimed at exposing or disclosing it, or damaging or editing it while it is being stored, transferred or processed. That definition covers both usual ransomware scenarios: data theft, and encryption that damages or alters data. The Law also treats health data, financial data and children's data as sensitive data, which is exactly what clinics and HR and payroll systems hold.
A quotable definition: a ransomware recovery plan is a written, tested document that states which systems are restored first, from which isolated backup, who makes the decisions, and when and how the authorities and data subjects are notified.
What does Egyptian law require after a ransomware attack?
The table below summarises the duties in Article 7 of the Law, Article 5 of the Executive Regulations issued by Ministerial Decree 816 of 2025, and the penalty in Article 38. It is a technical summary, not legal advice; have a qualified lawyer assess each incident.
| Duty | Deadline | Details | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Report to the Personal Data Protection Center | Within 72 hours of becoming aware of the breach | Through the Center's electronic portal or the hotline it provides for this purpose | Law Art. 7; Regulations Art. 5 |
| Entry in a secured electronic register | With the report | Time and date of awareness and of reporting, nature and timing of the breach, likely consequences and expected harm, urgent measures taken, the data protection officer's details, and any documents the Center requests | Regulations Art. 5 |
| Breach linked to national security | Immediately | The report must add the link to national security, the volume of affected data and an estimate of the harm | Law Art. 7; Regulations Art. 5 |
| Notify the data subjects | Within three working days of reporting to the Center | The breach and the security measures taken, through the channel agreed when the data was collected (text message, email or phone call) | Law Art. 7; Regulations Art. 5 |
| Penalty for non-compliance | - | A fine of EGP 300,000 to EGP 3 million for any controller or processor that fails its duties under Articles 4, 5 and 7 | Law Art. 38 |
One practical point matters: the duty falls on "the controller and the processor, as the case may be". If your clinic uses a system hosted by a service provider, the processor also has a reporting duty, and your contract should state who reports, when, and how both sides share information.
Why do ordinary backups fail against ransomware?
CISA states plainly that many ransomware variants look for accessible backups and delete or encrypt them, so that recovery becomes impossible unless the ransom is paid. In small environments, four weak patterns come up again and again:
- An always-connected disk or NAS: if the infected account can see the backup folder, so can the attacker.
- One admin account for everything: the account that manages the server is the same one that can delete the backups.
- Keeping a fixed number of copies: the UK's NCSC warns that an attacker can flood the store with a series of corrupted backups until the good ones are replaced, so it recommends retention by a fixed time period rather than a fixed number of backups.
- A backup that was never tested: an incomplete copy, such as a database without the radiology and lab attachments, is discovered at the worst possible moment.
How do you build ransomware-resistant backups?
The table below brings together eight controls from two government sources: CISA's guide, updated in September 2023, and the NCSC principles for ransomware-resistant cloud backups, published on 22 November 2024.
| Control | What it means in practice | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Offline, encrypted backups | At least one copy that cannot be reached from the everyday network, with its availability and integrity tested regularly in a recovery scenario | CISA |
| Immutable storage or delete protection | Turn on delete protection or object lock for storage, with care, because misconfiguration can raise costs | CISA |
| Retention by time, not by count | For example daily backups kept for a month and monthly backups for a year, so good copies cannot be pushed out by corrupted ones | NCSC, Principle 3 |
| Separate out-of-band access | A separate account or device that can reach the backups even if every company system is down | NCSC, Principle 2 |
| Protected encryption keys | A paper copy of the master key in a safe place, because a lost key means a lost backup | NCSC, Principle 4 |
| Alerts on significant changes | Alerts for mass deletion, stopped backups or changed retention, delivered through a channel that does not depend on the compromised network | NCSC, Principle 5 |
| Golden images of critical systems | Up-to-date operating system and application templates to rebuild a server quickly, with installers and licence files stored alongside the offline backups | CISA |
| A hard copy of the response plan | The incident response and communications plans available on paper and offline, approved in writing by senior management | CISA |
What exactly should a clinic or company back up?
A complete backup of a clinic, ERP or HR system covers the database, the attachments folder (radiology, lab results and scanned documents), configuration and integration files, audit logs, and installers and licences. For hosted websites and systems, add the site files, DNS settings, and the business mailbox if it holds customer data.
What is the 72-hour plan after a ransomware attack?
The two legal deadlines (72 hours for the Center and three working days for data subjects) are fixed. The breakdown inside them is our practical suggestion, based on the response checklist in CISA's guide:
- Hour one: identify the affected devices and isolate them immediately, and coordinate by phone rather than company email so the attacker is not tipped off. Only power devices down if you cannot disconnect them, because memory holds evidence. Record the time and date you became aware of the incident; it is the first item in the regulatory register.
- By hour 24: check the isolated backups and confirm they are clean before connecting them to anything, identify the affected data, its categories and approximate volume, and look for signs of data exfiltration.
- By hour 72: file the report with the Personal Data Protection Center with the required items, document the urgent measures taken, and keep a copy of the report.
- Recovery: rebuild critical systems first from clean images, reset passwords, close the gap the attacker used, then restore data from offline backups onto a clean network.
- Within three working days of the report: notify the affected individuals through the agreed channel, explaining what happened and what was done.
A 10-point checklist before any attack
- A written list of critical systems and their restore order, such as appointments and patient files, then accounting.
- A written target for each system: how many hours of data you can afford to lose, and how many hours of downtime you can tolerate.
- At least one copy that is offline or cannot be deleted during its retention period.
- Backup admin accounts separate from server admin accounts, with multi-factor authentication.
- Retention by a fixed time period, with an alert whenever a backup job fails.
- A real restore test on a staging server; we recommend at least once a quarter.
- The master encryption key stored on paper in a safe place.
- Clauses in your hosting or support contract that state who reports to the Center and who isolates systems.
- The data protection officer's details and the data subject notification channel prepared in advance.
- A paper copy of this plan and contact numbers kept off the network.
How can Smart One Group help?
At Smart One Group we build and host clinic, HR and ERP systems, so we design backups and restore tests into our hosting and server services and support contracts. If you are still completing your legal requirements, see our data protection compliance checklist. To review your current backup plan, get in touch.
Frequently asked questions
Do we have to report if data was encrypted but not stolen?
The Law's breach definition covers damaging or editing data while it is stored, not only disclosing it, so malicious encryption should be assessed as a possible breach with a qualified lawyer within the 72-hour window.
Who reports to the Center: the clinic or the hosting company?
Article 7 places the duty on the controller and the processor "as the case may be". Agree in your contract who files the report and how you share information in the first hours.
When does the 72-hour clock start?
From the time you become aware of the breach, not from when it happened. That is why the Regulations require the time and date of awareness to be recorded precisely in the electronic register.
Is immutable cloud storage enough?
It is an important layer, but CISA cautions that it may not meet some compliance criteria and that misconfiguration can impose significant cost. Combine it with an offline copy and separate access.
How often should we test restoring backups?
CISA recommends testing backups regularly without fixing an interval. Our practical recommendation is a full restore test at least once a quarter, and after every major system change.
What is the fine for not reporting under Egyptian law?
Article 38 sets a fine of EGP 300,000 to EGP 3 million for any controller or processor that fails its duties under Articles 4, 5 and 7, including the reporting duty.




